Teleological

Even assuming China does follow other East Asian countries into
the upper ranks of wealthy, well-governed countries, the process of
development will take decades if not longer to reach a relatively
stable equilibrium, after which change will continue, albeit in less
dramatic fashion, just as it does in Euro-America. Moreover, capitalism,
rule of law, democracy, and human rights are sufficiently
contested in theory and varied in practice that the final outcome in
China cannot be specified at this point—much to the chagrin of
those who would press their own version of liberal democracy on
China. As China negotiates modernity, and indeed postmodernity, it
may very well give rise to one or more novel varieties of capitalism,
rule of law, democracy, and human rights. On the other hand, there
is enough minimal determinate content to each of these four aspects
of modernity to provide a teleological orientation to the process that
is likely to survive into the next decades, barring extraordinary catastrophes
that change radically the nature of contemporary society.

It seems that the author made an improper use of the term teleological.

I think he meant: On the other hand, there is enough evidences to determine what orientation development reform practices will take the next decades, unless there is extraordinary catastrophes that will changes the nature of society.

The meaning of teleological has been stretched. Are we even allowed to do that?