I don't get it

Why reproduce all that junk in translation? Consider the following text (preface) from Kant's first Kritik, 1781:
Die menschliche Vernunft hat das besondere Schicksal in einer Gattung ihrer Erkenntnisse: da=DF sie durch Fragen bel=E4stigt wird, die sie nicht abweisen kann; denn sie sind ihr durch die Natur der Vernunft selbst aufgegeben, die sie aber auch nicht beantworten kann; denn sie =FCbersteigen alles Verm=F6gen der menschlichen Vernunft.

Meiklejohm 1855:
Human reason, in one sphere of its cognition, is called upon to consider questions, which it cannot decline, as they are presented by its own nature, but which it cannot answer, as they transcend every faculty of the mind.
Max M=FCller, 1881:
OUR reason (Vernunft) has this peculiar fate that, with reference to one class of its knowledge, it is always troubled with questions which cannot be ignored, because they spring from the very nature of reason, and which cannot be answered, because they transcend the powers of human reason.
Norman Kemp Smith, 1929:
HUMAN reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer.

My version:
Human Reason suffers the peculiar fate, that, in one department of knowledge, it is beset by questions which it cannot set aside, as they arise from the nature of Reason itself; but these questions it cannot answer, for they transcend all the powers of our Reason.

Comment: My version has better rhythm and is less 'clunky' than the others.In diese Verlegenheit ger=E4t sie ohne ihre Schuld. Sie f=E4ngt von Grunds=E4tzen an, deren Gebrauch im Laufe der Erfahrung unvermeidlich und zugleich durch diese hinreichend bew=E4hrt ist. Mit diesem steigt sie (wie es auch ihre Natur mit sich bringt) immer h=F6her, zu entfernteren Bedingungen. Da sie aber gewahr wird, da=DF auf diese Art ihr Gesch=E4ft jederzeit unvollendet bleiben m=FCsse, weil die Fragen niemals aufh=F6ren, so sieht sie sich gen=F6tigt, zu Grunds=E4tzen ihre Zuflucht zu nehmen, die allen m=F6glichen Erfahrungsgebrauch =FCberschreiten und gleichwohl so unverd=E4chtig scheinen, da=DF auch die gemeine Menschenvernunft damit im Einverst=E4ndnisse steht.

Dadurch aber st=FCrzt sie sich in Dunkelheit und Widerspr=FCche, aus welchen sie zwar abnehmen kann, da=DF irgendwo verborgene Irrt=FCmer zum Grunde liegen m=FCssen, die sie aber nicht entdecken kann, weil die Grunds=E4tze, deren die sich bedient, da sie =FCber die Grenze aller Erfahrung hinausgehen, keinen Probierstein der Erfahrung mehr anerkennen. Der Kampfplatz dieser endlosen Streitigkeiten hei=DFt nun Metaphysik.

Meiklejohn, 1855:It falls into this difficulty without any fault of its own. It begins with principles, which cannot be dispensed with in the field of experience, and the truth and sufficiency of which are, at the same time, insured by experience. With these principles it rises, in obedience to the laws of its own nature, to ever higher and more remote conditions. But it quickly discovers that, in this way, its labours must remain ever incomplete, because new questions never cease to present themselves; and thus it finds itself compelled to have recourse to principles which transcend the region of experience, while they are regarded by common sense without distrust.

It thus falls into confusion and contradictions, from which it conjectures the presence of latent errors, which, however, it is unable to discover, because the principles it employs, transcending the limits of experience, cannot be tested by that criterion. The arena of these endless contests is called Metaphysic..
Max M=FCller, 1881:Nor is human reason to be blamed for this. It begins with principles which, in the course of experience, it must follow, and which are sufficiently confirmed by experience. With these again, according to the necessities of its nature, it rises higher and higher to more remote conditions. But when it perceives that in this way its work remains for ever incomplete, because the questions never cease, it finds itself constrained to take refuge in principles which exceed every possible experimental application, and nevertheless seem so unobjectionable that even ordinary common sense agrees with them.

Thus, however, reason becomes involved in darkness and contradictions, from which, no doubt, it may conclude that errors must be lurking somewhere, but without being able to discover them, because the principles which it follows transcend all the limits of experience and therefore withdraw themselves from all experimental tests. It is the battle-field of these endless controversies
which is called Metaphysic.
Norman Kemp Smith, 1929:The perplexity into which it thus falls is not due to any fault of its own. It begins with principles which it has no option save to employ in the course of experience, and which this experience at the same time abundantly justifies it in using. Rising with their aid (since it is determined to this also by its own nature) to ever higher, ever more remote, conditions, it soon becomes aware that in this way -the questions never ceasing -its work must always remain incomplete; and it therefore finds itself compelled to resort to principles which overstep all possible empirical employment, and which yet seem so unobjectionable that even ordinary consciousness readily accepts them.

But by this procedure human reason precipitates itself into darkness and contradictions; and while it may indeed conjecture that these must be in some way due to concealed errors, it is not in a position to be able to detect them. For since the principles of which it is making use transcend the limits of experience, they are no longer subject to any empirical test. The battle-field of these endless controversies is called metaphysics.
My version:
Yet no blame lies upon Reason for falling into this embarrassment. It begins with principles, which, in the course of experience, have proved quite indispensable and sufficiently trustworthy. Borne up with these principles (and as demanded by its nature), it ascends to ever higher and more remote conditions. When, though, it discovers that its work can never be completed in this manner-as the questions never cease-Reason is driven to seek refuge in principles which, though transcending any possible application to experience, occasion no distrust. Then Reason finds itself plunged into darkness and contradictions, from which it can only infer that some-where must be lurking errors that it can not detect, because the principles which Reason employs, as they reach beyond experience, do not admit of examination by trial. The battle-field of these endless conflicts is called Metaphysics.
Comment:
'Falls..fault" (used in Meiklejohn and copied by Smith) is to my ears inelegant, so following M=FCller, I chose 'blame', using a construction "lies upon" found in Trollope's 'The Eustace Diamonds': "And you'll find also that she'll contrive that all the blame shall lie upon him." Other constructions used by Trollope feature 'cast': "No blame by such an assertion is cast upon the young Conservative aspirant for party honours." He uses 'imputed in 'Can You Forgive Her': " He had said no more than this-had imputed no blame to Alice-had told none of the circumstances; but Seward had known that the girl had jilted his friend, and had made up his mind that she must be heartless and false." Also, "on her head": "Don't put the blame on her head"

The point is that there are many constructions one can use for assigning 'blame'. I chose one from 'The Eustace Diamonds' because it seemed appropriate for the metaphor, where Reason is taken as a sort of personage.
The second sentence in the original is not excessively wordy, but all of the translations are. I avoided that by refusing to repeat the expression 'experience'. M=FCller comes close, but even his is too wordy.
The next sentence needs considerable work. If translated literally, it seems tautologous:
"Reason takes refuge in principles which, even though they transcend all possible application in experience, are so innocent-seeming that ordinary human reason (common sense) agrees with them."

Well, duh! Why include the bit about "ordinary human reason" when 'reason' is already the subject of this sentence? Why explain that "common sense" or "ordinary human reason" agrees with them if they seem 'innocent'?
Anyway, "die gemeine Menschenvernunft" is usually translated as "common sense", which obscures the relationship between 'Menschenvernunft' and 'Vernunft'. 'Tis better simply to leave it out, as I did, and simply say: "occasion no distrust". What is the English reader missing here? Nothing!